03785nam a2200373 a 4500001001200000003000800012006001900020007001500039008004100054010001700095020003800112020003500150040002100185035002100206043002100227050002700248082002000275100002600295245010300321260003700424300003100461490004100492504005300533505235600586533015202942650003403094650002903128655002903157700002303186710001703209830004203226856012603268999001703394ebr10235189CaPaEBRm        u        cr cn|||||||||080114s2008    caua    sb    000 0 eng    z  2008001579  z9780833042972 (pbk. : alk. paper)  z0833042971 (pbk. : alk. paper)  aCaPaEBRcCaPaEBR  a(OCoLC)560594529  aa-iq---an-us---14aDS79.769b.P555 2008eb04a956.7044/342221 aPirnie, Bruce,d1940-10aCounterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)h[electronic resource] /cBruce R. Pirnie, Edward O'Connell.  aSanta Monica, CA :bRand,c2008.  axxvii, 106 p. :bcol. ill.1 aRand counterinsurgency study ;vv. 2  aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 99-106).0 aSummary -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Overview of the conflict in Iraq -- Ba'athist regime -- Invasion of Iraq -- Occupation of Iraq -- First priority : setting up a constitutional government -- Spring -- The spiral downward begins (Spring 2004) -- Benchmark one : holding Iraqi elections -- Islamic extremists and sectarian violence -- A U.S. approach hesitantly unfold -- Armed groups in Iraq -- Overview -- Kurdish separatists -- Sunni Arab insurgents -- Violent extremists -- Shi'ite Arab militias -- Criminal gangs -- Insurgent use of terrorism -- Counterinsurgency in Iraq -- Organization and recognition of the U.S. COIN effort is slow to unfold -- Traditional U.S. military forces may need to be adjusted -- Fallujah -- Tal Afar -- Baghdad -- Air support -- Combatting improvised explosive devices -- Detainee operations -- U.S. development and support of Iraqi forces -- Iraqi police -- Iraqi armed forces -- Assessing progress in counterinsurgency -- Iraqi casualties and displacement -- Iraqi economy -- Iraqi opinion -- Accounting for success and failure -- Understanding Iraqi society -- Little planning for the occupation of Iraq -- The impact of a lack od international support for the war -- The disastrous effects of prematurely dismantling the Ba'athist regime -- The challenge of building a new Iraqi state from scratch -- Instituting a new system of justice -- Undertaking the reconstruction of Iraq -- The consequences of failing to maintain security early on military missions -- Lck of infiltration and tips hinder intelligence on the insurgency -- Building effective capabilities for counterinsurgency -- Use of force -- Public safety and security -- Partnering with and enabling indigenous forces -- Reporting on the enemy and infiltration -- Provision of essential services -- Informing and influencing operations -- Rigorous and coordinated detainee operations -- Recommendations -- Development of strategy -- Coalition-building -- Planning process -- Unity of effort -- Interagency process -- Host-nation governance -- Funding mechanisms -- Counterinsurgency as a mission -- Protection of the indigenous population -- Personnel policy -- U.S. Army special forces -- Partnership with indigenous forces -- Policing functions -- Brigade organization -- Gunship-like capability -- Intelligence collection and sharing.  aElectronic reproduction.bPalo Alto, Calif. :cebrary,d2013.nAvailable via World Wide Web.nAccess may be limited to ebrary affiliated libraries. 0aPostwar reconstructionzIraq. 0aCounterinsurgencyzIraq. 7aElectronic books.2local1 aO'Connell, Edward.2 aebrary, Inc. 0aRand counterinsurgency study ;vv. 2.40uhttp://site.ebrary.com/lib/rucke/Doc?id=10235189zAn electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view  c38733d38733