<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<mods xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" version="3.1" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-1.xsd">
  <titleInfo>
    <title>Crisis and escalation in cyberspace</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Libicki, Martin C.</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
  <genre authority="marc">bibliography</genre>
  <genre authority="">Electronic books.</genre>
  <originInfo>
    <place>
      <placeTerm type="code" authority="marccountry">cau</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <dateIssued encoding="marc">2012</dateIssued>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
  </originInfo>
  <language>
    <languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</languageTerm>
  </language>
  <physicalDescription>
    <extent>1 online resource (199 pages) : illustrations (some color)</extent>
  </physicalDescription>
  <tableOfContents>Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses.</tableOfContents>
  <note type="statement of responsibility">Martin C. Libicki.</note>
  <note>"Prepared for the United States Air Force."</note>
  <note>"Approved for public release; distribution unlimited."</note>
  <note>Includes bibliographical references (pages 163-172).</note>
  <subject>
    <geographicCode authority="marcgac">n-us---</geographicCode>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <name type="corporate">
      <namePart>United States.</namePart>
      <namePart>Air Force</namePart>
    </name>
    <topic>Organization</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <name type="corporate">
      <namePart>United States.</namePart>
      <namePart>Air Force</namePart>
    </name>
    <topic>Decision making</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Information warfare</topic>
    <geographic>United States</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Escalation (Military science)</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Cyberspace</topic>
    <topic>Security measures</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Crisis management</topic>
    <topic>Government policy</topic>
    <geographic>United States</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Cyberterrorism</topic>
    <topic>Prevention</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Conflict management</topic>
  </subject>
  <classification authority="lcc">U163 .L518 2012eb</classification>
  <classification authority="ddc" edition="23">358.4/141</classification>
  <relatedItem type="otherFormat" displayLabel="Print version:">
    <titleInfo>
      <title>Crisis and escalation in cyberspace</title>
    </titleInfo>
    <name>
      <namePart>Libicki, Martin C.</namePart>
    </name>
    <originInfo>
      <publisher>Santa Monica, CA : RAND, Project Air Force, 2012</publisher>
    </originInfo>
    <physicalDescription>
      <extent>xxvi, 172 pages ; 23 cm</extent>
    </physicalDescription>
    <identifier type="local">(DLC)  2012046227</identifier>
  </relatedItem>
  <identifier type="isbn" invalid="yes"/>
  <identifier type="isbn">9780833076793 (e-book)</identifier>
  <identifier type="uri">http://site.ebrary.com/lib/rucke/Doc?id=10818055</identifier>
  <location>
    <url>http://site.ebrary.com/lib/rucke/Doc?id=10818055</url>
  </location>
  <recordInfo>
    <recordContentSource authority="marcorg">CaPaEBR</recordContentSource>
    <recordCreationDate encoding="marc">121116</recordCreationDate>
    <recordIdentifier source="CaPaEBR">ebr10818055</recordIdentifier>
    <languageOfCataloging>
      <languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</languageTerm>
    </languageOfCataloging>
  </recordInfo>
</mods>
