000			05468nam a2200469 i 4500
001			ebr10818055
003			CaPaEBR
006			m o d
007			cr cn|||||||||
008			121116s2012 caua ob 000 0 eng|d
020			_z9780833076786 (pbk. : alk. paper)
020			_a9780833076793 (e-book)
040			_aCaPaEBR _beng _erda _epn _cCaPaEBR
043			_an-us---
050	1	4	_aU163 _b.L518 2012eb
082	0	4	_a358.4/141 _223
100	1		_aLibicki, Martin C.
245	1	0	_aCrisis and escalation in cyberspace / _cMartin C. Libicki.
264		1	_aSanta Monica, CA : _bRAND, Project Air Force, _c2012.
300			_a1 online resource (199 pages) : _billustrations (some color)
336			_atext _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _2rdacarrier
500			_a"Prepared for the United States Air Force."
500			_a"Approved for public release; distribution unlimited."
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 163-172).
505	0		_aAvoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses.
588			_aDescription based on print version record.
590			_aElectronic reproduction. Palo Alto, Calif. : ebrary, 2014. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ebrary affiliated libraries.
610	1	0	_aUnited States. _bAir Force _xOrganization.
610	1	0	_aUnited States. _bAir Force _xDecision making.
650		0	_aInformation warfare _zUnited States.
650		0	_aEscalation (Military science)
650		0	_aCyberspace _xSecurity measures.
650		0	_aCrisis management _xGovernment policy _zUnited States.
650		0	_aCyberterrorism _xPrevention.
650		0	_aConflict management.
655		0	_aElectronic books.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _aLibicki, Martin C. _tCrisis and escalation in cyberspace. _dSanta Monica, CA : RAND, Project Air Force, 2012 _hxxvi, 172 pages ; 23 cm _z9780833076786 _w(DLC) 2012046227
797	2		_aebrary.
856	4	0	_uhttp://site.ebrary.com/lib/rucke/Doc?id=10818055 _zAn electronic book accessible through the World Wide Web; click to view
999			_c78415 _d78415